Can Religion tell us anything important? (part 2)...

In part 1 of, Can Religion tell us anything important?, I described how a materialistic view of the world is incapable of accounting for the origin of abstract realities, such as morality. Tautologies result when one attempts to rationalize the existence of morality within the confines of personal taste. For instance, if a relativist were to posit that his definition of right and wrong is simply the result of a combination of physical events, such as culture, education, electrical impulses in the brain, etc., and that the next fellow’s definition of right and wrong is also the result of a combination of physical events (albeit different events), then he’s at a loss to give any compelling reason why his morality should trump the other fellow’s. That could be disheartening, especially if the most noble act in the other fellow’s system of morality was that of killing and dismembering the relativist. What argument could he use to try and prevent the other fellow from going through with such an act of violence? If he claims that killing and dismembering another human being is against the law, the other guy could respond that his morality doesn’t recognize the law. If he claims that such an act is opposed by the majority of the populace, the other guy could respond with “so what?”. If he claims that such an act intrudes on his love of life, the other guy could respond that his morality tells him that such an act will actually free the relativist from the confines of this corrupt, physical world, while also uplifting him spiritually. When you get right down to it, in a world of relativistic thought, there isn’t anything he can say to prevent this person from committing such an act. What’s more, the very act of attempting to dissuade the murderer illustrates that the relativist considers one form of morality to be better than another and, in so doing, the relativist steps over his own relativistic line in the sand. In everyday discussion this foul occurs whenever the relativist announces that the opinion of the majority overrules the morality of the individual. Once he has stepped over the line the relativist has betrayed his initial assertion that morality is relative – he has appealed to some standard that the other fellow must adhere to, whether by choice or by force. The tautology is complete. As J. Budziszewski tells us in, What We Can’t Not Know, the proposition that all meaning is relative is self-defeating, for if the proposition all meaning is relative was true, then the proposition itself would be relative. If the proposition is relative, then it carries no weight. Unfortunately, in the past week we have been witness not to a potential scenario of right vs. wrong, but to a real-life example. A question I like to propose to the purveyors of relative morality has to do with the individual who tortures and kills infants simply for the pleasure. I propose that such an act is wrong, it has always been wrong, and it will always be wrong. For those lost in the quagmire of relativity, though, while they themselves consider the act to be wrong (usually), they find that they cannot commit to declaring that the act is absolutely wrong. After all, they say, how can one be sure? Terrorists kidnap, torture, and murder children in Belsan, Russia. Putin said that the hostage-takers had begun to shoot children out of boredom. The believer in transcendent morality understands that people can’t not know that such acts are evil. Meanwhile, the relativist is left thanking his lucky stars that the majority of the populace, for now, are still of the opinion that such acts are wrong. How well do these opposing worldviews address the realities of the world which we view? UPDATE: Check the post, Dostoevsky and the Demonic, over at Moteworthy.com, for an insightful commentary on the terror in Russia. ...to be continued